Horwich On The Leibnizian Ratio Against Absolute Space And Motion by Fernando Birman
11
HORWICH ON THE LEIBNIZIAN RATIO 
AGAINST ABSOLUTE SPACE AND 
MOTION
FERNANDO BIRMAN
Delft University of Technology
EuJAP  |  VOL. 7  |  No. 1  |  2011 
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER
UDK 1 Horowich, P.
         1 Leibnitz, G.W.
         113/119
53-05 Newton, I.
ABSTRACT
I will argue that Paul Horwich’s classical 
reconstructions of the Leibnizian arguments 
against absolute space and absolute motion 
are flawed. First, I will introduce Newton’s 
conception of space and motion, and Horwich’s 
analysis of the Leibnizian response to Newton’s 
argument. I will then present what, I think, is 
the correct interpretation of Leibniz’s response 
to Newton. Next, I will explain why Horwich’s 
stance probably follows from his imperfect 
understanding of Leibniz’s notion of force. I will 
finally present Leibniz’s positive argument for 
a relational conception of space, and maintain 
that, once again, Horwich is likely mistaken in 
his analysis of the argument, or rather of what the 
argument entails.         
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Introduction1. 
The still very much alive debate on 
the absolute-relational nature of space 
does not begin, in spite of what several 
authors tentatively suggest,1 with the 
correspondence between G. W. Leibniz 
and S. Clarke. There are at least two long 
and rich pre-Modern traditions, one of 
which extends to Aristotle and the other of 
which originates probably with the ancient 
atomists, which also deal with what we call 
at present the absolute-relational controversy 
concerning space.2 For Aristotle and his 
followers, the notion of space is parasitic on 
the notion of body. The notion of a space 
independent of a certain arrangement or 
relation of bodies is incoherent. What is 
ontologically essential is the notion of 
body, upon which the notion of space can 
be construed as an abstraction. For the 
atomists and their followers, on the other 
hand, space is real. It is something that 
has an autonomous existence and that can 
be thought of as the container of bodies. 
There is nothing incoherent, accordingly, 
in referring to a space deprived of bodies – 
that is, a vacuum. To put it differently, the 
idea of space is fully intelligible on its own, 
independently of the concept of body. 
For Descartes and the Cartesians, in the 
1   Cf., for example, Reichenbach (1958), Nagel (1961).
2  For an outstanding account of its history, see Grant 
(1981).
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seventeenth century, the answer to the question of the nature of space is fundamentally 
the same as the one provided by Aristotle. Space does not have an independent reality 
and, accordingly, the existence of a vacuum is prohibited.3 For other early-Modern 
philosophers, like Gassendi (who promoted atomism) and Pascal, space has ontological 
independence and, therefore, the existence of vacuum is permitted.4       
         
Notwithstanding this, it is unquestionably in the discussion between Newton and 
Leibniz, embodied in the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence of 1715–16, where we first 
find the two sides of this long and frequently ill-defined controversy about the nature 
of space methodically laid down and argued for.5 Newton puts forward an absolutist 
conception of space and motion, where the absoluteness of motion plays an essential role 
in his defense of absolute space. Leibniz rejects, somewhat obscurely, the absoluteness 
of motion while offering a positive argument for a relationalist conception of space.      
Next I will quickly go through Newton’s conception of space and motion, paying special 
attention to his famous bucket experiment, and introduce Horwich’s interpretation 
of Leibniz’s response to Newton’s argument. In section three, I will present what, I 
think, is the correct interpretation of Leibniz’s response to Newton on the existence of 
absolute motion, based on Leibniz’s own account of the matter. I will then explain, in 
section four, why Horwich’s flawed interpretation probably follows from his imperfect 
understanding of Leibniz’s key notion of force. Finally, in section five, I will present 
Leibniz’s positive argument for the relational conception of space and will argue that, 
once again, Horwich is likely mistaken in his understanding of this argument, or rather 
in his diagnosis of what the argument entails. I will maintain, in a word, that Leibniz’s 
metaphysical underpinning of the argument –namely, the principle of identity of 
indiscernibles– does not necessarily bring about the collapse of the most part of modern 
physics, as Horwich suggests, but merely the abandonment of haecceitism.6
Absolute space and absolute motion2. 
As noted above, there is a long tradition of thought, beginning with the ancient 
atomists, according to which the notion of space is independent of the notion of body. 
The tradition asserts, in other words, that space is ontologically independent from 
any configuration of bodies that occupy it. Isaac Newton is unquestionably the most 
distinguished supporter of this view in the seventeenth century, and probably in all 
history. For Newton, space is an infinite all-pervasive medium made up of qualitatively 
3  Cf. Garber (1992, 127–36) and (1995, 301). A notable exception to this Aristotelian view among the Cartesians is 
Cordemoy. 
4  Garber (1992, 136–43) and (1995, 301–2).  
5  It must be acknowledged, however, that even the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke is plagued with mutual 
distrust and a surprising lack of understanding. Grant, in connection with the correspondence, affirms (1981, 250): 
“It was less a genuine dialogue than two monologues in tandem where, by some strange coincidence or prearranged 
harmony, the letters of each correspondent contain identically numbered paragraphs that frequently treat the same 
theme”.
6  One might wonder here why Paul Horwich’s views on this matter deserve a separate discussion, more so if deemed 
mistaken. Why is his 30-year-old reconstruction of, as well as his reaction to, Leibniz’s relationist conception of space 
still relevant to us? My answer to this question, which is admittedly somewhat idiosyncratic, is that Horwich’s views are 
still taught in many classrooms, and his 1978 paper is still often presented as a faithful approach to Leibniz’s relation-
ism. I want to thank one of the referees for putting this question to me. 
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indistinguishable points. Each such point continues to exist throughout time. All 
material objects occupy at a given time a definite set of space-points. And for an object 
to be in motion is for it to occupy distinct sets of space-points at different times.7 It 
seems clear that Newton’s absolutist conception of space does not rely on, or derive 
from, the notion of body. Although our measurements invariably refer to relative spaces 
– that is, the relative positions of material bodies, there always exists this underlying 
absolute space in which the notions of absolute position and absolute motion make 
sense. Newton says:
Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, 
remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable 
dimension or measure of the absolute spaces, which our senses determine 
by its position to bodies … Place is a part of space which a body takes 
up, and is according to the space, either absolute or relative … Absolute 
motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place into another; 
and relative motion, the translation from one relative place into another … 
But because the parts of [absolute] space cannot be seen, or distinguished 
from one another by our senses, therefore in their stead we use sensible 
measures of them … And so, instead of absolute places and motions, we 
use relative ones, and that without any inconvenience in common affairs. 
But in philosophical disquisitions, we ought to abstract from our senses, and 
consider things themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of 
them. (Newton 1687, Book I, Scholium to definition VIII)    
It is beyond doubt, then, that in Newtonian mechanics absolute space is real –as 
opposed to (say) a useful mathematical device which allows us to distinguish between 
inertial and non-inertial systems, independently of the presence of material bodies 
and their metrical and topological configuration. It is beyond doubt, moreover, that 
absolute space would be just as real even if the world happened to be, counterfactually, 
a perfect vacuum.8
But Newton goes beyond the mere postulation of an absolute space that cannot 
be, allegedly, empirically pinned down to offer a positive argument from which its 
existence can be conclusively inferred. The argument is based on his famous bucket 
experiment. In Newtonian mechanics all coordinate systems moving rectilinearly and 
uniformly – that is, all inertial coordinate systems – are identical as far as the laws 
of motion are concerned.9 It is not possible to perform any mechanical experiment 
7  Cf. Horwich (1978, 398).
8   It is not beyond doubt, however, what absolute space is for Newton. According to Garber (1995, 302), in the second 
edition of 1713 of the Principia Newton identifies absolute space with God himself. However, in his correspondence 
with Leibniz, Clarke, championing the Newtonian view, claims that absolute space is just a property or quality of God. 
But Earman (1989, 112) affirms that Clarke’s opinion on this matter differs from Newton’s. He points out, based on 
Newton’s De Gravitatione, that Newtonian absolute space “has its own manner of existence which fits neither substanc-
es nor accidents” (Hall and Hall 1962, 132). Still, Earman thinks that Newton’s overall doctrine can be viewed as a firm 
defense of space conceived as a substance (1989, 113), and he cites Newton again from De Gravitatione, who claims 
that the manner in which absolute space exists, which fits neither substances nor accidents, “approaches more nearly to 
the nature of substance” (Hall and Hall 1962, 132). Grant (1981, 254), however, agrees with Garber that Newtonian 
absolute space, despite all ambiguities, can be positively identified with a three-dimensional, infinitely extended God.   
9   This is, of course, the old Galilean principle of relativity. The relativistic principle of relativity, unlike the Galilean 
14
EuJAP  |  VOL. 7  |  No. 1  |  2011 
within one of these systems so as to determine whether it is moving or resting relative 
to absolute space. One can arbitrarily predicate any velocity of inertial systems, as long 
as the relative velocities are preserved. It is clear, then, that the existence of absolute 
space does not follow from, and seems even undermined by, Newtonian kinematics. 
Newton, however, observes that the existence of absolute space can indeed be inferred 
from dynamical considerations, more particularly, from the behavior of rotating bodies. 
And this is precisely what the bucket experiment is intended to show.
We start with a bucket of water suspended by a twisted rope. The rope is left free to 
unwind. The bucket begins to rotate. After a few moments, the motion of the bucket 
is transferred to the water. The bucket and the water are now rotating freely. But the 
bucket is suddenly stopped –before the rope begins to wind again. And the water keeps 
rotating. 
We can divide this process into four successive stages:
(a) Bucket and water at rest: flat water (b) Bucket rotates, water at rest: flat water
(c) Bucket and water rotating (at rest    
relative to each other): concave water
(d) Bucket at rest, water rotates: concave 
water
According to Newton, all four stages of this experiment can only be fully accounted for 
if we assume the existence of absolute space. The relative motion of bucket and water 
fails to account for the concavity of water in (c) and (d), since such relative rotation 
is neither necessary – stage (c) – nor sufficient – stage (b) – condition for concavity. 
And so, Newton concludes, the water’s concavity must be a consequence of its absolute 
rotation relative to absolute space.
The argument can be reconstructed as follows:10
(1) To explain the concavity of water one must find some circumstance which 
is present during (c) and (d) and absent during (a) and (b). 
(2) The relative rotation of bucket and water does not satisfy (1).
(3) The only plausible alternative is, then, the absolute rotation of water. 
(4) Absolute rotation is the change of absolute spatial location with respect 
to time.
(5) The water’s absolute spatial location changes from (a)–(b) to (c)–(d).   
The immediate lesson that follows from (5) is, of course, that absolute space exists. 
Now, this argument can be famously objected to in various ways depending on which 
particular premise is targeted. The most celebrated objection is due to Ernst Mach, 
who challenges the acceptability of (3). Mach (1883) notes that the water’s rotation 
relative to the distant “fixed” stars could also explain its concavity, for this circumstance 
principle, encompasses as well the laws of electromagnetism developed by J. C. Maxwell in the nineteenth century. 
10   Newton’s argument, as stated in the Principia, involves only three steps. Moreover, it has been argued –cf. Rynasie-
wicz (1995) – that the argument does not involve explanation at all. I want to thank one of the referees for stressing 
these points.
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is present only during (c) and (d).11 There is another famous approach, however, which 
targets the acceptability of (4). According to this approach, Newton’s idea that absolute 
motion is to be identified with a change in absolute spatial location is unjustified. The 
most influential proponent of such approach is Sklar (1974). Sklar maintains that 
absolute motion is not to be identified with motion relative to an absolute frame of 
reference. He claims, moreover, that absolute motion is not to be viewed as a kind 
of motion – i.e. change with respect to something external – at all, but rather as a 
monadic property of things, which at times belongs to objects. For Sklar, therefore, 
absolute motion is just an intrinsic property of bodies, such as mass, charge, spin, and 
so forth. And its empirical detection, in spite of Newton’s argument, does not amount 
to evidence for the existence of absolute space. 
According to Horwich’s classical and influential analysis (1978), Sklar’s strategy against 
Newton’s argument is precisely the strategy that Leibniz puts forward in response to 
Newton. Horwich claims, oddly enough, that Leibniz’s answer to Newton’s argument is 
that the water in (c) and (d), receding from the axis of motion, does indeed experience 
absolute motion, due to the fact that its rotation is the cause of the relative motion of 
the water with respect to the bucket. He says: 
… Leibniz adopted just this position in response to Newton’s argument. He 
maintained that certain objects in motion relative to others were the cause 
of that relative motion; and these could be said to be in absolute motion. 
Such objects are said to be in absolute motion, not in virtue of any variation 
in their absolute position, but merely because they are responsible for the 
changes in their position relative to other objects. (Horwich 1978, 402) 
According to Horwich’s interpretation of Leibniz, then, the water in (c) and (d) is 
indeed in absolute motion, but this is so not in virtue of any variation in its absolute 
position – its position relative to absolute space, but merely because it is responsible 
for the changes in its position relative to other bodies. And so this purportedly allows 
Leibniz to circumvent Newton’s result in terms of the existence of absolute space. 
I will present next Leibniz’s principle of the “general equivalence of hypotheses” – 
general relativity of motion – and discuss his somewhat obscure argument, based on 
this principle and his theory of rigid motion, against Newton’s bucket experiment. It 
will then become clear, I believe, that notwithstanding all its obscurity and alleged 
inconsistencies, Leibniz’s argument cannot be what Horwich takes it to be. 
The general equivalence of hypotheses3. 
    
The Galilean principle of relativity states that any coordinate system moving rectilinearly 
and uniformly behaves identically as far as the laws of motion are concerned. This 
means that, as a matter of physical law, it is not possible to perform any mechanical 
11  It is worth noting that, notwithstanding Hans Reichenbach and Ernest Nagel’s famous accounts, Newton himself 
considered the possibility of explaining the water’s inertial effects in terms of its motion relative to external bodies. But 
he dismissed this possibility, together with Leibniz and Huygens, because he judged it implausible. Cf. Earman (1989, 
65) and Huggett (1999, 20).
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experiment within these systems which determines whether they are in absolute motion 
or at absolute rest. Following this principle, then, one is entitled to assert that any 
hypothesis describing the state of motion of any set of inertial systems is equivalent to 
any other hypothesis, as long as the relative motions of these systems are preserved. 
     
We observed in the previous section that Newton’s bucket experiment is intended to 
demonstrate that this equivalence of hypotheses is not a general feature of the science 
of mechanics, since there exist circumstances, where dynamical considerations come 
into play, in which, for Newton, it is possible to establish which bodies are absolutely 
moving and which bodies are not. Thus, the water receding from the axis of motion in 
(c) and (d) is, for Newton, absolutely rotating, while the flat water in (a) and (b) is not. 
It is incorrect, as a result, to contend that all hypotheses describing the state of motion 
of this system are equivalent, as long as the relative motions are preserved. There is a 
privileged coordinate system, the one that Newton associates with absolute space (the 
one in which the stars are fixed), in which the water can be truthfully described as 
being in absolute motion.
 
And it is exactly at this point, of course, where the main conflict between Newton and 
Leibniz concerning the relativity of motion arises. Leibniz refuses to accept that there 
exists any privileged coordinate system. He rejects, in other words, the idea that there 
is a way in which absolute motion can be, even in principle, detected – which could 
in turn be transformed, as Newton does above, into an argument for the existence of 
absolute space. Leibniz maintains, on the contrary, that the equivalence of hypotheses 
is not restricted to kinematics, but is rather a general principle of mechanics. In one of 
his letters to Huygens (1694), he writes:
Newton recognized the equivalence of hypotheses in the case of rectilinear 
motions; but he believes, with respect to circular motions, that the effort 
circulating bodies exert to move away from the center or from the axis of 
circulation allows us to recognize their absolute motion. But I have reasons 
that lead me to believe that there are no exceptions to the general law of 
equivalence. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 308)
And in A Specimen of Dynamics (1695), he says:
… The entire nature of motion is relative, so that from the phenomena one 
cannot determine with mathematical rigor what is at rest, or the amount 
of motion with which some body is moved. This holds even for circular 
motion, though it appeared otherwise to Isaac Newton … He thought that, 
with the help of circular motion, he could discern which subject contains 
motion from centrifugal force, something with which I could not agree. 
(Ariew and Garber 1989, 125)
It seems clear then that Leibniz’s response to Newton cannot be what Horwich takes 
it to be. But why is it that Leibniz clashes with Newton on the absoluteness of circular 
motion based on its inertial effects? What are the reasons that drive Leibniz “to believe 
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that there are no exceptions to the general law of equivalence”. If we now confidently 
establish that Leibniz’s response to Newton, notwithstanding Horwich’s account, does 
not amount to a recognition of absolute motions and the contention that absolute 
motions are not, against Newton, the harbinger for absolute space – which amounts 
to a rejection of step (4) above, then we must find an alternative ratio which moves 
Leibniz to reject Newton’s argument. We must find, that is, some argument which 
forces Leibniz to rebuff Newton’s notion of absolute motion and absolute space and 
uphold the general equivalence of hypotheses.12
His argument, which is almost unanimously deemed obscure and unsatisfactory,13 goes, 
in a nutshell, as follows. First, Leibniz puts forward a theory of motion in which the 
cohesion of rigid bodies in motion is not due to any true firmness or rigidity in them, 
but rather a corollary of their concurrent motion, of a kind of internal coordinated 
movement. Second, Leibniz notes that all motion is in straight lines or compounded 
of straight lines: “All motion is rectilinear or composed of rectilinear motions” (Ariew 
and Garber 1989, 135). Third, Leibniz formulates the principle of the equivalence of 
hypotheses for uniform and rectilinear motion – i.e. the Galilean principle of relativity, 
according to which any inertial coordinate system is as good as any other. Finally, in A 
Specimen of Dynamics (1695), he puts all these pieces together and writes:   
I cannot agree with certain philosophical opinions of certain important 
mathematicians, who … take motion to be an absolute thing, and strive to 
prove this from rotation and the centrifugal force that arises from it. But since 
rotation also arises only from a combination of rectilinear motions, it follows 
that if the equivalence of hypotheses is preserved in rectilinear motions, 
however they might be placed in things, then it will also be preserved in 
curvilinear motions. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 136–7) 
Thus, the idea seems to be that all curvilinear motion is ultimately made up of very 
short segments of uniform and rectilinear motion, the direction of which is constantly 
changed, though preserving an internal coordinated movement, by collision with other 
bodies. And then, since the equivalence of hypotheses is valid in every case of uniform 
and rectilinear motion, it must also be valid in all cases of curvilinear motion. In a 
piece written in 1689, Leibniz emphatically establishes this conclusion, asserting that 
the general equivalence of hypotheses precludes all possible observers from detecting 
absolute motions, even when such curvilinear motions are present:
Since we have already proved through geometrical demonstrations the 
equivalence of all hypotheses with respect to the motions of any bodies 
whatsoever, however numerous, moved only by collision with other bodies, 
it follows that not even an angel could determine with mathematical rigor 
which of the many bodies of that sort is at rest, and which is the center of 
12   Along similar lines, Garber (1995, 306) concludes that “… Leibniz knew of Newton’s claim, and just as he rejected 
absolute space, he rejected Newton’s absolute motion”.
13  Cf. Garber (1995, 306), Earman (1989, 71–3), Stein (1977, 3–6). It is quite likely Leibniz himself was not com-
pletely satisfied with his relational treatment of rotation, which is suggested by the fact that he never published his 
response to Newton. 
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motion for the others. And whether the bodies are moving freely or colliding 
with one another, it is a wondrous law of nature that no eye, wherever in 
matter it might be placed, has a sure criterion for telling from the phenomena 
where there is motion, how much motion there is, and of what sort it is, or 
even whether God moves everything around it, or whether he moves that 
very eye itself. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 91)
As suggested above, a majority of scholars agree that at least two problems compromise 
Leibniz’s argument. Since such problems do not concern the main thread of this study, 
I will just mention them here. First, leaving aside whether the argument is consistent 
with Leibniz’s rejection of atomism in the first place, there is no explication in the 
theory as to the mechanism by which the motion of rigid bodies, especially of rotating 
bodies, can be accounted for in terms of some rectilinear coordinated motions. How 
can such motions be coordinated precisely in order to produce rotations? Second, the 
argument is based on the assumption that there is an absolute and independent notion 
of rectilinear motion. But this assumption, to be consistent with Leibniz’s relationalism, 
is unwarranted.14      
Now, Horwich’s assertion that, for Leibniz, certain objects “… could be said to be 
in absolute motion” has been, I think, well discredited. No motion can disrupt the 
general equivalence of hypotheses. But Horwich’s rationale behind this claim is that 
some objects in motion are the cause of relative motions. And, in my opinion, he 
mistakenly claims of these objects in motion to be, for Leibniz, identifiable as being in 
absolute motion. I will maintain in what follows that Horwich’s mistake arises, quite 
likely, from his somewhat imperfect understanding of Leibniz’s notion of force.  
     
Force, mechanistic philosophy, and Aristotelian metaphysics 4. 
Horwich notes that certain objects in motion relative to others can be viewed as the 
cause of that relative motion, which is consistent with Leibniz’s view that, given a set of 
bodies in relative motion, there is always a force applied to some of them that causes the 
relative motion. However, Horwich believes that, for Leibniz, this claim is equivalent to 
the claim that those bodies upon which the force is applied can be positively identified 
as being the recipient of such force – exactly like we can positively identify objects as 
being the bearer of intrinsic properties such as mass, charge, spin, etc. – which singles 
them out as being in absolute motion. And this, as discussed above, is likely wrong. 
For Leibniz, no force can disrupt the general equivalence of hypotheses. Even though 
we know that there are forces acting on some of the objects in relative motion, there is 
nothing to be done which could determine which objects are indeed the cause of the 
relative motion. As Garber voices the point: 
… But, Leibniz argues, underlying motion there must be force, the cause of 
motion, something that goes beyond the mechanist’s world of extension and 
its modes, something that really pertains to one body rather than another. 
There is, in this sense, a correct frame for determining motion, the frame in 
14  Cf. Earman (1989, 72–3).
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which the motions observed are the effects of real underlying forces which 
are their causes. But such a frame could never be identified. (Garber 1995, 
308)   
It seems clear that the presence of forces acting upon objects does not disrupt the 
general equivalence of hypotheses.15 For Leibniz, there is no inconsistency in claiming 
both that motion actually belongs to certain bodies, those bodies upon which the 
forces are applied, and that we are incapable, as a matter of principle, of determining 
which bodies are these.
    
But now a subsequent problem arises. We know, on the one hand, that Leibniz (as 
Newton, Descartes, and many others) sees the world through the eyes of the seventeenth 
century mechanistic philosophy, according to which, roughly speaking, everything 
in the world is matter and motion. And, on the other hand, we have just learned 
that forces, for Leibniz, are beyond the realm of matter and motion – that is, beyond 
the realm of material bodies and their relative motion. Why does he bring up forces 
then? Why does he turn to forces when dealing with matter and motion? A plausible 
explanation is, as Garber points out, that Leibniz’s conception of force performs the 
primordial task of fitting the physical world of matter and motion into the Aristotelian 
metaphysical scenario in which Leibniz places the mechanical world. Garber says:
In this way Leibniz can say … that everything in the world happens 
mechanically, but that the world of the mechanical philosophers is grounded 
in something quite different than extended matter and motion, an Aristotelian 
metaphysics of substantial form and primary matter; it is the dynamics, the 
science of force that links the underlying Aristotelian metaphysics with the 
physics of the mechanists. (Garber 1995, 293) 
But this is just half the response. Why does Leibniz, opposing Newton, think it necessary 
to attach non-mechanical forces to the mechanical phenomenon of motion? Why does 
he specifically resort to forces as such critical metaphysical anchoring? The answer, I 
think, is that Leibniz, if we accept his commitment to the Aristotelian metaphysical 
background, needs a subject for motion. For Leibniz, a mere relative motion would 
lack a determinate subject, being then impossible for it to be a real constituent of the 
world. Leibniz finds it completely unintelligible that there could be a property that is 
not really a property of an individual, a property that is irreducibly relational. Hence, if 
motion is to be real, Leibniz believes that it must be grounded in something that is not 
a mere relation, something that is a real property of things. And this is precisely the role 
that, from this perspective, non-mechanical Leibnizian forces play. As Garber puts it:
For Leibniz, all real properties of things in the world ultimately reside in 
genuine individuals. If that is the case, it is evident why mere motion, the 
mere change of place, just won’t do; for it to be intelligible that there is 
15  Leibniz acknowledges, however, that there might be an exception to this rule, whenever human beings are the 
seat of the force. In such cases, we might be able to determine which bodies are the cause of motion through the effort 
felt.
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motion at all, there must be something nonrelativistic, something that is 
an absolute and nonarbitrary property of some individual thing, that is the 
cause and ground of motion. This is where force comes in. The present state 
of the world must have a ground in reality, in some configuration of forces; 
something must be there, though Leibniz cannot say what specifically. 
(Garber 1995, 309)  
 
But this is clearly not the kind of force that Horwich has in mind when he maintains 
that forces, which cause relative motions, let us pinpoint which objects are in absolute 
motion and which objects are not. He seems to uphold, on the contrary, the classical-
mechanical Newtonian notion of force. And thus his assertion, which I have been 
disputing here, that Leibniz’s response to Newton’s bucket experiment simply amounts 
to an indication, with Sklar, that step (4) in the Newtonian argument is unjustified 
– that is, that absolute motion is not necessarily motion relative to absolute space. 
For Leibniz, once again, nothing can disrupt “the general equivalence of hypotheses”. 
Not even forces. Leibniz’s conception of force, despite Horwich’s account, does not 
appear to bring about our physical recognition of absolute motion, but rather the 
metaphysical grounding of relative motion in reality.    
Absolute space, haecceitism, and the identity of indiscernibles5. 
In the third letter to Clarke (1716), Leibniz writes:
I have many demonstrations to confute the fancy of those who take space 
to be a substance, or, at least, an absolute being. But I shall only use, at 
present, one demonstration … I say, then, that if space were an absolute 
being, something would happen for which it would be impossible that there 
should be a sufficient reason – which is against my axiom. And I can prove it 
thus. Space is something absolutely uniform, and without the things placed 
in it, one point of space absolutely does not differ in anything from another 
point of space. Now, from hence it follows (supposing space to be something 
in itself, besides the order of bodies among themselves) that is impossible 
there should be a reason why God, preserving the same situation of bodies 
among themselves, should have placed them in space after one certain 
particular manner and not otherwise – why everything was not placed the 
quite contrary way, for instance, by changing east into west. But if space is 
nothing else but this order or relation, and is nothing at all without bodies 
but the possibility of placing them, then those two states, the one such as 
it is now, the other supposed to be the quite contrary way, would not at 
all differ from one another. Their difference therefore is only to be found 
in our chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in truth, 
the one would exactly be the same thing as the other, they being absolutely 
indiscernible, and consequently there is no room to inquire after a reason for 
the preference of the one to the other. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 325)  
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This is Leibniz’s famous argument for a relational conception of space.16 Unlike the 
prior argument presented above to counter Newton’s argument, this offers a positive 
rationale for upholding the relationalist conception of space. The structure of this 
argument can be reconstructed thus:
(1) Let us assume space is an absolute being.       
(2) Space, without bodies placed in it, is uniform (homogeneous and 
isotropic): one point does not differ from any other point.
(3) For everything there is, there is a sufficient reason (ratio).
(4) But there is no sufficient reason why God should have placed the world, 
preserving its internal relative structure, in a particular orientation or specific 
region of absolute space.    
(5) Statements (3) and (4) contradict each other.
(6) Space is not an absolute being.
Leibniz quickly points out that his relationalist conception of space does not give rise 
to a similar problem, for if space is nothing but a set of relations among material 
bodies, then any purportedly different arrangement of them in terms of their spatial 
orientation or their location in space would “collapse”, given Leibniz’s principle of 
identity of indiscernibles, into one and the same arrangement.     
Many responses have been famously put forward over the centuries to counter this 
argument. We could naturally avoid its conclusion by rejecting either premises (2) 
or (3). We could entertain, for example, that it follows from the general theory of 
relativity that space is not uniform – although, in favor of the Leibnizian view, the 
structure of space is indeed correlated with the distribution of matter. Or we could 
simply maintain that (3) is untenable, for several interpretations of quantum mechanics 
suggest a moderate principle of indeterminacy or acausality in the physical world. I will 
bring the present discussion to a close, however, by examining Horwich’s own response 
to the argument, which, I think, is based on an extremely feeble attack on Leibniz’s 
principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII). 
As just noted, Leibniz believes that PII makes his relationalist conception of space 
immune to any threat of inconsistency between the principle of sufficient reason and 
the conjectured existence of multiple but indiscernible worlds. All such indiscernible 
worlds would collapse into one and the same world. But Horwich accuses PII of being 
untenable because, he claims, PII has devastating consequences for modern physics. 
He declares: 
 
Such Leibnizian arguments are by no means conclusive. Not only have 
we presented no justification for the particular Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles upon which they rely, but, when applied in other areas, the 
Principle quickly leads to unacceptable results. Thus Leibniz refutes atomic 
theory, arguing that if particles A and B were qualitatively identical, there 
16   Next, Leibniz shows in the same way that time is just “the successive order of things” (Ariew and Garber 1989, 
325).
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would not be a distinct possible world, indiscernible from our own, in which 
their positions are interchanged. This sort of reasoning would leave us an 
intolerably impoverished ontology, annihilating most of what physics tells 
us to believe in. (Horwich 1978, 409)
Horwich is then arguing that: (i) there is no obvious justification for PII; (ii) PII has 
awful consequences for modern physics, and must then be rejected. Concerning (i), it 
is not true that Leibniz presents us with PII without any justification – cf., for instance, 
Discourse on Metaphysics, section 9 (Ariew and Garber 1989, 41–2). But even if we put 
aside Leibnizian metaphysics and consider PII in a broader context, there are many 
reasons of empiricist-verificationist nature – cf., for example, Reichenbach (1958, 210) 
– that could certainly be brought to its defense. The point I would like to address at 
this juncture, nevertheless, is (ii). 
Horwich claims that PII is unacceptable because its application to modern physics 
yields an intolerably poor ontology. Let us study his case in more detail.17 Imagine 
two particles of the same kind – say, two electrons – A and B in world w1. The set of 
properties of A and B is respectively PA and PB. These sets are coextensive, except for 
their position vectors (xA, yA, zA) and (xB, yB, zB), which are different. Consider now 
world w2 in which everything else is like in w1 but PA and PB have been interchanged 
– that is, A and B have swapped locations. According to PII, w1 and w2 are identical, 
since a world in which A is defined by PA and B is defined by PB is indiscernible from 
a world in which A is defined by PB and B is defined by PA. And this result is what 
Horwich finds intolerable. He states that this conclusion carries the seeds of an almost 
complete destruction of contemporary physics, the annihilation of “… most of what 
physics tells us to believe in”.
I believe, as suggested above, that there exists a serious non sequitur in Horwich’s 
reasoning. The application of PII to physics would just rule out, as the previous example 
clearly reveals, the viability of physical haecceitism.18 PII just precludes, in other words, 
the possibility of attaching any indexical mark or “this-ness” to particles A and B, for 
the attachment of such marks would necessarily entail that w1 and w2 are different, 
although indiscernible, worlds. But there is nothing in PII which compromises the 
alleged richness and multiplicity of modern physics’ ontology beyond the abandonment 
of haecceitism, or which refutes atomic theory. It can be easily proved, in contrast, that 
the abandonment of haecceitism based on PII does not amount to any substantial 
weakening of the otherwise generous ontology of modern physics – abandoning 
haecceitism, by itself, does not entail in any way the collapse of complex structures into 
17  What follows does not constitute in any way an exhaustive discussion of PII and haecceitism. I personally agree 
with the view – cf., for instance, Earman (1989) – that haecceitism should not be lightly abandoned for very general 
and somewhat elusive reasons, but rather, if at all, for specific reasons on a piecemeal basis. I have discussed this matter 
elsewhere in connection with quantum mechanics. In the present paper, the question of haecceitism is only tangentially 
addressed, to the extent that it compromises Horwich’s reconstruction of Leibniz’s position.    
18  The term haecceitas was originally coined by Duns Scotus, to refer to the individual essence or “this-ness” of things. 
The term is here employed in the following sense – cf. Albert (2000, 45): Haecceitism“…is the doctrine that two worlds 
which differ from each other by means of nothing over and above a simple permutation of the positions of otherwise 
identical material particles are (nonetheless) different”.   
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simpler ones.19 Horwich, nonetheless, states that PII “… quickly leads to unacceptable 
results”, but he fails to demonstrate how, in his view, such disastrous consequences 
would certainly be the case. 
The only sense in which, in my view, Horwich’s point would be of real concern is the 
following. PII would indeed be a major threat to the ontology of physics if we lived in 
a highly symmetrical universe. As Black’s classical paper (1952) notes, the ontology of a 
highly symmetrical world subjected to PII would “collapse”, due to the indiscernibility 
of its symmetrical parts, to a minimally symmetrical ontology. Differently put, in any 
world subjected to PII, a high level of symmetry is inconsistent with a high level of 
ontological complexity. And this conclusion is certainly disturbing.20 But Horwich, in 
any case, does not appear to be considering this possibility. He seems to believe, on the 
contrary, that PII constitutes a decisive blow to the ontology of physics regardless of 
whether our world is highly symmetrical or not.  
It is my belief, in sum, that Horwich’s contention that PII is intolerable because it rules 
out most of modern physics is false. PII just excludes the possibility of haecceitism in 
physics – which is not, in any obvious way, unacceptable. However, PII would indeed 
be a serious threat to the ontology of modern physics if we lived in a highly symmetrical 
world. But such diagnosis is hardly new but rather a classical and well-known result. 
And Horwich, in any case, does not appear to be thinking about this possibility.
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